



**Director of  
Central  
Intelligence**

**Top Secret**

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# **National Intelligence Daily**

***Thursday  
21 January 1982***

**Top Secret**

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
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
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
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POLAND: Political Activities

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2 Many local party officials who have been on the defensive for 16 months are taking the opportunity to settle scores with those who humiliated them. Party secretary Orzechowski, who reputedly has close ties with Premier Jaruzelski, last week publicly condemned this practice. 

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Comment: One of the main goals [redacted]  
[redacted] may be to bring some order to the seemingly  
spontaneous purge of party ranks in many localities.  
2 The leadership apparently is concerned that the party  
is losing some good people. [redacted]

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### Weather's Impact

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2 Poland's unusually harsh winter has placed additional strains on the economy. Bad weather has on several occasions stalled rail and highway traffic, hampered trans-loading operations in the Baltic ports, and impeded movement of coal supplies. [ ]

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1  
2 North of Warsaw, flooding of river lowlands has destroyed thousands of hectares of winter grains and has isolated rural residents. Forecasts indicate continued below-normal temperatures and greater-than-normal snow-fall well into February. [ ]

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2 Comment: The severe weather probably has helped dampen active resistance to the imposition of martial law. It also potentially provides an alibi for poor economic performance. The continuation of bad weather could affect leadership discussions of reform options by hindering accurate assessments of passive resistance and its costs to the economy. [ ]

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### Solidarity Day

3  
4 Most West European governments are responding positively to the call for an International Solidarity Day on 30 January, but their plans for observances remain tentative and incomplete. Each EC government will organize activities in its own way. Many West European national trade unions also will sponsor Solidarity Day activities, but the major West European labor confederations apparently are not planning European-wide initiatives. [ ]

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2 Comment: Close coordination of Solidarity Day activities seems increasingly unlikely. Although several West European leaders have agreed to make individual televised statements, such actions do not signal fundamental policy changes on Poland. [ ]

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USSR - WESTERN EUROPE: Pressures Regarding Poland

*The Soviets are putting pressure on some West European governments not to adopt a critical stance toward the USSR in connection with Poland.*

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Comment: The Soviets are disappointed that their media campaign did not dissuade West European governments from subscribing to EC and NATO statements criticizing the USSR's role in Poland. They are applying more direct pressure on some West European governments.

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Moscow probably will continue to invoke the benefits of East-West trade--especially the Siberian pipeline project--the INF talks in Geneva, and CSCE in urging the West Europeans not to follow the US lead in imposing sanctions. The Soviets also are likely to continue to use positive inducements to encourage West European receptivity to their concerns.


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SA-8 in Moscow

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SYRIA-USSR: SA-8s Detected

*The appearance in Syria of the first SA-8 surface-to-air missile system outside the Warsaw Pact underscores the importance the USSR assigns to its ties with Syria.*

Comment: The Syrians will use the highly mobile missile system to strengthen the air defense capability of their armored and mechanized infantry units. Although the system could be deployed ultimately to Lebanon, it probably will remain in Syria until the Soviets train the Syrians on it.

The shipment is part of Moscow's ongoing agreement to upgrade Syrian military capabilities. Delivery may have been promised during Syrian Defense Minister Tlas's visit to Moscow last September--when a major new arms deal evidently was signed--and appears to be in response to heightened Syrian-Israeli tensions.

The SA-8 may soon appear in the inventories of Libya, Iraq, and other Soviet hard currency arms clients. In 1981 the Soviets also agreed to sell the system to Jordan; those deliveries are to begin late this year.

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SOUTH KOREA - NORTH KOREA: Reunification Initiative

*South Korean President Chun is to announce a major new proposal on Korean reunification tomorrow.*

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Chun will call for the normalization of relations between the two Koreas through an interim agreement that focuses heavily on measures to reduce current North-South tensions. The longer term part of the plan calls for drafting a constitution for a unified Korea, a referendum to legalize it, and the establishment of a unified government through general elections.

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North Korea has consistently refused to deal with the Chun government. It continues to demand the withdrawal of US troops and the ouster of Chun as preconditions for new negotiations.

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Comment: The proposal on reunification is the most detailed and flexible ever put forth by Seoul. Chun hopes to retain the initiative on this emotional issue, attract increased international support, and increase the prestige of his government.

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The North Koreans almost certainly will disparage Chun's initiative, even though it has some features similar to P'yongyang's unification proposal of October 1980 to form a confederation. North Korea is likely to criticize the proposal for an interim agreement as a ploy to maintain the two Koreas.

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NATO: Possible Dispute Over Turkey

*The increasing unhappiness of some NATO Allies with the military regime in Turkey could complicate the effort to build a consensus against the martial law regime in Poland.*

The Norwegian Government on 14 January blocked the shipment of 34 antiaircraft guns that had been offered to Turkey before the military takeover in 1980. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs says the decision was taken in light of political developments in Turkey, especially the prosecution of 52 radical labor leaders, and would be reevaluated if developments warrant. Meanwhile, in a clear allusion to Turkey, Danish Foreign Minister Olesen argued at a NATO meeting last week that the Alliance should not apply a double standard for military regimes on human rights.

13  
The Norwegian Foreign Minister had indicated before the embargo that he did not think it useful to pursue the Turkish question at NATO, but the Norwegian Government has shown increasing concern over reported human rights violations in Turkey. The Danes also have become concerned over conditions in Turkey, particularly after the Alliance condemned Poland and the USSR for what the Danes see as similar abuses.

Comment: The Norwegian action marks a new stage in the demonstration of West European dislike of the Turkish regime. Since the takeover, Ankara has been denied new EC economic credits and has been threatened with expulsion from the Council of Europe. Now it is under some pressure in military matters as well.

The Greeks probably will again seek to make Turkey an issue within NATO after being rebuffed last year. The issue could become more troublesome this year if the Norwegians, Danes, and others now support the Greeks. The discussion could undercut efforts by the major members of NATO to achieve a unified position on Poland.

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⑧ IRAN-LIBYA: Oil Workers for Libya

Iran's Oil Minister, according to press reports, has announced that 2,000 Iranian oil workers will be sent to Libya to replace departing US personnel. An Iranian delegation visited Libya last week. [REDACTED]

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Comment: Iran probably can send this many workers to Libya because of high unemployment in its oil industry. Most are likely to be semiskilled; purges presumably have created a shortage of managers and skilled technicians. It is unclear why Tripoli would agree to accept the Iranian workers, other than for symbolic reasons. Libya appears to be having little difficulty in finding highly skilled European workers to replace the 650 departing US technicians. [REDACTED]

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ZAIRE: Economic Reform Measures

President Mobutu has undertaken to reduce economic mismanagement in return for assurances of increased support from the US. He has enhanced the role of several senior officials committed to reforms urged by the IMF, has begun to change management and marketing practices in the mining industry to limit inefficiency and corruption, and has reduced government interference in other areas of the economy such as coffee and petroleum. Mobutu also has said he will use promised Western military aid to strengthen key Army units in Kinshasa and in Shaba Region.

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Comment: Prospects are not good that Mobutu will remain committed to economic reform because he fears that the austerity measures called for by the IMF will continue to increase political and social pressures. In the coming months Mobutu will call for substantial Western aid and another round of rescheduling of Zaire's \$5 billion foreign debt. The President is counting on the US to intervene on Zaire's behalf with the international financial community and to supply military support if economic hardships result in social upheaval.

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